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EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Gary L. McJJowell. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 1982. Pp. xvii, 180. $20.

Commentators have debated for years the role of judicial activism and
policy-making in a constitutional democracy. I Moreover, both advocates
and critics of judicial activism have often focused their debate on the desegregation cases, starting with Brown v. Board of Education. 2 Gary McDowell's Equity and the Constitution, therefore, is not the first book criticizing
the Court's activist role, nor is it the first to cite Brown and its progeny as a
primary example of judicial legislation. The book is unique, however, in
analyzing the Court's exercise of its equity power to formulate relief in
these cases. McDowell argues, after an historical examination of equity jurisprudence, that the Supreme Court has exceeded the equity power granted
in the Constitution. Though McDowell musters an impressive analysis of
equity history, his narrow historical perspective ultimately limits the impact
of this contribution to the judicial activism debate.
The main argument in Equity is that the Court's use of its equitable
powers to extend broad relief in the desegregation cases violated the "great
tradition of equity jurisprudence" (p. 121) and, therefore, exceeds the equity power granted by Article III of the Constitution.3 McDowell authoritatively traces the principles of equity from their Aristotelian origins to the
concept of equity incorporated in the Constitution. He emphasizes two
principles of traditional equity inherent in that constitutional concept.
First, the exercise of equity power is limited to specific extraordinary cases
which involve exceptions to general rules; equitable relief is only available
where strict application of a general rule oflaw would lead to a result contrary to the intent of the rule. Second, strict rules and adherence to precedent must restrict judicial discretion to prevent courts from legislating
through the exercise of equitable powers. McDowell asserts that the Court
in Brown violated both principles: it ignored the particularities of each of
the four cases consolidated in Brown (p. 97); it found injury from segregation that was intangible, based on abstract rights derived solely from the
nature of the plaintiff's class, and neither clearly proven nor shown to be
irreparable (p. 98); it issued prescriptive decrees rather than merely enjoining enforcement of segregation laws (p. 109); and, finally, the Court
extended the relief beyond the plaintiffs as individuals to their racial class
(p. 100). These actions, which the Court perpetuated in subsequent decisions, transformed the traditional limited judicial power into a broad "soci1. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (criticizes judicial activism
based on the fourteenth amendment); 0. F1ss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (favors
judicial use of equity powers); N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION (1975) (denounces
activism as beyond constitutional powers); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) (favors fierce judicial activism).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (decision for plaintiffs); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (formulation of remedy). See p. 4 for the author's listing of the most controversial equity-related decrees; citations
start at p. 155.
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. I reads, in part: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity . . . ."
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ological understanding of equity" (p. 110) that entangles the Court in
policymaking.
McDowell also argues that the Court lacks the institutional capacity to
make the policy choices its reasoning in Brown depends on. Unfortunately,
the reader can only follow this argument with some difficulty. In his introduction, McDowell states that: "An older political science assumed that the
formulation of policies that were to reach the lives of people were more
safely written by the duly elected representatives of the people . . . . It was
never assumed that the judiciary was competent for that task" (p. 10). This
argument is lost in McDowell's discussion of equity history but resurfaces
in his criticism of the desegregation cases. McDowell's proof of the Court's
incapacity rests on the assertion that "one need only consider the lack of
consistency in the Court's decisions as well as its continued reliance on sociological and psychological research for its standard of constitutional meaning" (p. 121). This assertion might be supported implicitly by McDowell's
discussion throughoutEquilj' of historic concerns about the exercise of judicial discretion and by his criticism of the intangible nature of the constitutional injury found by the Court. McDowell erred, however, in placing the
burden of finding support for this assertion on the reader. Given the growing literature on judicial capacity to formulate policy,4 McDowell's passing
comments are not very persuasive.
After establishing that the Court has over-stepped the bounds of its
traditional equitable powers, McDowell proposes that Congress restrain the
Court and restore the limited scope of equitable relief by exercising its constitutional powers over the judiciary.5 This proposal, offered without analysis or support, seems simplistic at best. It assumes a broad Congressional
power to manipulate the powers of the federal courts, an assumption widely
disputed. 6 Moreover, it ignores the crucial link between legal rights and
remedies. Brown itself illustrates that courts protecting widely violated
rights will devise equally broad solutions. McDowell must realize that his
focus on equity alone will not be enough to restrain the activist Court; Roe
v. Wade ,7 the abortion case, for example, did not involve the Court's equity
power. Thus, he concludes Equilj' by calling for an attempt to change public opinion of the Court and its actions, apparently assuming that the public
favors the Court's activism: "The first step in righting our current judicial
wrongs is to muster all possible rhetorical force against the prevalent view
and to educate public opinion" (p. 135).
McDowell's concentration on equitable powers, while making Equilj'
unique, results in a narrow perspective that limits the book's persuasiveness. In the debate over the propriety of judicial activism, McDowell's po4. See, e.g.~ D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 2 subjects Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to Congressional regulation. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 9 grants Congress the power to constitute tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court.
6. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide lo Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229
(1973); Forkosch, The Exceptions and Regulations Clause ofArticle Ill and a Person's Constitutional Rights: Can the Lal/er Be Limited by Congressional Power Under the Former?, 72 W.VA.
L. REV. 238 (1970).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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sition in favor of the "equity tradition" places him in the interpretivist
camp.8 Consistent with this interpretivist status, McDowell devotes a few
pages of his "epilogue" to a criticism of the noninterpretivist idea of a "living Constitution" (pp. 127-30). He also criticizes the Brown Court's "dubious doctrine" (p. 131) of psychological equal protection and offers an
alternative basis for finding a constitutional right in the Brown plaintiffs
that would be more acceptable to interpretivists.9 But McDowell does not
attempt to formulate a complete interpretivist argument nor to place his
views in the context of other interpretivist scholarship. In focusing solely
on equitable relief, he slights the broader framework needed to support his
conclusions. 10
Equity's narrow perspective also prevents McDowell from addressing
opposing arguments. He assumes, apparently, that Equity proves a return
to tradition is the only rational course of action. ·Yet McDowell devotes a
chapter to "Joseph Story's 'Science' of Equity" (pp. 70-85) and writes that
Story believed, like others, that "[e]quity, like the common law generally,
was not a static entity but a dynamic system of jurisprudence" (p. 82). McDowell fails to discuss the possibility that this flexible, dynamic system equity - could expand to accommodate class relief where appropriate. 11
A related failure is McDowell's total disregard of the social and political
context existing at the time of the desegregation decisions. 12 At that time,
Congress had the power to legislate in the civil rights area, but it had not
done so. Expansion of equity is arguably appropriate in Brown because of
two arguments that follow from this context. First, the broad class relief
that the Court rendered in Brown was the most practicable relief to vindicate the rights of the individual plaintiffs, especially in light of congressional inaction. Second, although Congress had the power to restrain the
Court after Brown, it chose not to do so because the Court was handling a
sensitive political issue Congress was incapable of handling at the time.
Regardless of the true validity of these and similar arguments that supporters of the desegregation decisions may advance, the significant point is that
8. The two sides in the dispute on constitutional theory have been labeled "interpretivism"
and "noninterpretivism." The nature of the former is that: "[J]udges deciding constitutional
issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the
written Constitution." The opposing noninterpretivistic view is that: "[C]ourts should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered wtihin the four corners of the document." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST I (1980) (footnote omitted). See
also Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
9. "In the Brown . . . cases, the Court would have been on firmer ground . . . had it
approached the 'separate but equal' doctrine as an infringement on liberty rather than as a
denial of equality." P. 131.
10. To justify his reliance on an historic interpretation of the Constitution, for example,
McDowell needs more than passing references to noninterpretivist viewpoints.
1I. McDowell recognizes and discusses cases that involved expanded use of the equity
power, although the Brown Court failed to use these as precedents. See pp. 101-05. He argues,
however: "[E]ven the more appropriate cases ... had never approached the massive expansion offederal equity powers at the expense of the tradition of the principles of equity jurisprudence to the extent that Warren expanded them in Brown . . . ." P. 105.
12. One commentator would assert the propriety of the desegregation decisions on the basis of societal values. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 237-38 (1962).
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Equity simply does not respond to them. 13
Finally, writers such as McDowell who spin crafty arguments in defense
of the "original understanding" of the Constitution inevitably endorse certain exceedingly unsavory results. Judges are, and should be, reluctant to
respond to the claims of those victimized by the base injustice of racial
discrimination or brutalized in total institutions by saying: "The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land and provides that
you shall not be so victimized or brutalized, but because of some arcane
technicalities, fully two centuries old, you will just have to go right on bearing the injustice you complain of." Certain arguments are far more satisfactory in the books of academics than in the opinions of the courts.
McDowell's Equity provides an excellent history of the traditional equity power. Equity also establishes that the Supreme Court's decisions in
Brown and its progeny violate that tradition. McDowell maintains a narrow historical perspective, however; he does not place his argument in the
context of other interpretivist views or answer opposing arguments. His
brief dismissal ofless historical constitutional interpretations and his failure
to analyze the broad substantive doctrines leading to expansive remedies,
among other omissions, tend to cripple his argument. McDowell's narrow
perspective prevents Equity from being a persuasive attack on judicial activism. Instead, Equity provides only another argument that interpretivists
may advance and noninterpretivists may reject as irrelevant. 14

13. McDowell does point out in a footnote that "[t]he new equity has had at least one
formidable advocate." See 0. F1ss,supra note 1. His response to Fiss is terse: "Fiss's celebration of the civil rights injunction, however, becomes intelligible only if one abandons the received wisdom of the tradition of equity jurisprudence . . . ." P. 138 n.13.
14. This book was also reviewed in 96 HARV. L. REV. 555 (1982).

